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B. Douglas Bernheim and John B. Shoven 
The private saving rate in the United States in 1984 has to be considered 
disappointing.  After the enactment of  a large  number of policies to 
make investment/saving more rewarding (such as liberalized Individual 
Retirement Accounts and  Keogh  Plans, the special tax treatment of 
some reinvested dividends, capital gains taxes which have been reduced 
twice in the past six years, and certainly increased investment incen- 
tives at the corporate level), the preliminary Bureau of Economic Anal- 
ysis (BEA) estimate for the 1984 personal saving rate is 6.1 percent of 
disposable  personal income. This is lower than the average personal 
saving rate in  the 1970s of 7.3 percent, and only imperceptably better 
than the 6.0 percent of the first four years of this decade. With all of 
these incentives, plus a robust economy and record high real interest 
rates, why was the personal  saving rate so low? We  are not going to 
attempt to answer this general question here. Rather, we suggest that 
personal saving needs to be examined in a disaggregated manner. Some 
of the policies just mentioned do not really provide incentives to save 
at the margin, but only serve to channel the existing quantity of saving 
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or wealth through particular vehicles. Undoubtedly, this accounts for 
at least some of the apparent sluggishness in private saving. 
Our topic, however, is the behavior of personal saving which results 
from the funding of pension plans. In this country, most covered work- 
ers participate in defined benefit plans, where the promised  pension 
annuity is based on years of service and level of compensation, and 
not  directly  on the funding status of  the plan or the  return  on the 
investments which have been  previously  acquired to fund  the plan. 
However, while the worker may be able to separate his or her accu- 
mulation of pension rights or wealth from the funding of  the plan, it is 
the aggregate funding contributions less outlays (i.e., benefits) which 
constitute a component of personal saving, and which generate loanable 
funds to finance investment or government deficits. Thus, the structure 
of defined benefit plans may produce a divergence between the apparent 
saving of  workers through the accumulation of pension rights and the 
actual creation of  loanable funds through net contributions to pension 
plan reserves. 
This can be an important phenomenon if only because pension funds 
are so large relative to financial markets and because pension contri- 
butions constitute such a large fraction of  personal saving. Also, net 
corporate pension contributions fell sharply in  1984. They amounted 
to 4.02 percent of personal disposable income in 1984, down from 6.02 
percent in 1982. Thus, the decline in pension funding was large enough 
to be responsible for the disappointing level of aggregate personal sav- 
ing. Indeed, these figures raise the possibility that, had pension con- 
tributions remained at their 1982 level, the personal saving rate might 
have risen by as much as 2 percent, to perhaps 8 percent in  1984. Had 
this indeed occurred, various policies designed to stimulate saving might 
have been judged more successful. 
To understand why corporate pension contributions dropped so sig- 
nificantly in 1984, one simply has to examine the defined benefit pension 
contract from the firm’s point of view. The liability of the firm is to 
pay for retirement annuities for its vested workers.  To  calculate the 
present value of this obligation, the firm typically predicts the magni- 
tude of those annuities (making some assumptions regarding wage growth 
until retirement,  labor turnover, etc.)  and then  discounts the future 
obligation to the present using an assumed interest rate. The resulting 
present value of liabilities is then compared to the value of the assets 
in the plan to arrive at the net unfunded liability. By law, contributions 
are related to the unfunded liability of the plan, although the companies 
have substantial discretion both as to the speed with which unfunded 
liabilities are amortized  and  in  the assumptions  which  are made in 
arriving at the value of unfunded liabilities. However, the key point is 
that from the company’s point of view, the funding of pension liabilities 87  Pension Funding and Saving 
is a target-the  higher the earnings of the assets funding the plan, the 
lower the contributions needed to meet the obligations. If  the assets 
earn more than the assumed discount rate used to value the liabilities 
(or if the assumed interest rate is raised or the assumed rate of growth 
of wages is lowered), the unfunded liability will be reduced (or, more 
relevantly for many companies, become negative) and the contributions 
will tend to decline. In the not-so-rare case (in 1984) of an overfunded 
plan, the law may force a reduction or an elimination of contributions. 
The very factors which have been hailed as the economic achievements 
of the past few years (e.g., a rising stock market and a reduction in 
wage inflation), combined with those high real interest rates which may 
encourage other kinds of saving, are the primary reasons behind the 
reduction in the number of underfunded plans and the sharp drop in 
pension contributions. As with the classic target saving examples, de- 
fined benefit pension contributions have a negative elasticity with re- 
spect to (real) interest rates. With pension contributions so large a part 
of total personal saving, the negative elasticity of this component may 
significantly offset the positive responsiveness of other components of 
saving. This effect has not been explicitly considered in previous studies 
of the interest elasticity of private saving (see, e.g., Boskin 1978, How- 
rey and Hymans 1978, and Summers 1981). 
We  have not investigated potential offsets to reductions pension con- 
tributions. Clearly, resources diverted from pension funds will be em- 
ployed elsewhere. Indeed, if investors penetrate all corporate and gov- 
ernmental veils, aggregate saving should be  unaffected. While these 
issues no doubt merit careful consideration, they are far too complex to 
treat within the context of the current study. It is therefore appropriate 
to emphasize that the negative elasticity of contributions to a defined 
benefit pension plan is not the result of intertemporal optimization on 
the part of either the firm or the workers; it is a purely mechanical re- 
sponse inherent in the funding rules for these types of plans. 
In section 3. I, some empirical information is given regarding pension 
contributions, unfunded liabilities, assumed interest rates, and recent 
developments in pension funding. Then in section 3.2, we present our 
target  saving model  of  pension  funding and derive the elasticity  of 
contributions  to changes in  interest rates.  Section 3.3 presents  our 
econometric estimates of aggregate contributions as a function of lagged 
interest rates, inflation rates, the pattern of wage growth, and the be- 
havior of the stock market. We  summarize our findings in section 3.4. 
3.1  Institutional Considerations 
As table 3.1 shows, most pension  plans (72 percent of  them) are 
defined contribution. However, the defined contribution plans are typ- 88  B. Douglas Bernheim/John B. Shoven 
Table 3.1  Basic Characteristics of Private Pension Plans, 
By Type of  Plan, 1978 
Defined  Defined 
Benefit  Contribution  Total 
Plans (#)  139,340  356,505  495,845 
Participants  36.1 mil  16.3 mil  52.4 mil 
Assets (market value)  $272.7 bil  $104.5 bil  $377.2 bil 
(28.1%)  (71.9%) 
(68.9%)  (31.1%) 
(72.3%)  (27.7%) 
SOURCE:  U.S. Department of  Labor (1983) 
ically small and often supplement a defined benefit plan  (a notable 
exception being TIAA-CREF, which is the largest pension plan in the 
United States). In terms of participants or assets, defined benefit plans 
dominate with about 70 percent of the total. To gain some appreciation 
of the aggregate size of private pension plans, note that the 52.4 million 
covered workers represent about 53 percent of all civilian employees 
in 1978, and the $377.2 billion in private pension assets amounts to 51 
percent of  the equity holdings of households in  1978. If government 
pensions were included, the Federal Reserve Flow of Fund figures show 
1978 pension assets at $593 billion. In comparison, households held 
$741 billion of corporate equity. 
Table 3.2 shows the number of  new plans qualified and terminated 
by type for the years 1974-84. Prior to this period, defined benefit plans 
had been growing more rapidly. In every year from 1956 to 1974, the 
number of  new  defined benefit plans  exceeded  the  number  of  new 
defined contribution plans. However, since the 1974 Employee Retire- 
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) the pattern has been reversed. In 
the first three quarters of  1984, the number of  defined benefit termi- 
nations was at a record level and the net growth in defined benefit plans 
was running at a 2 percent  yearly  rate. The changes in  the relative 
popularity of defined benefit versus defined contribution plans is almost 
certainly due to the funding, vesting, and insurance requirements  of 
ERISA for defined benefit plans. 
There are two sources of  data regarding aggregate private pension 
contributions and benefits, the Flow of Funds data of the Federal Re- 
serve System and the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Income 
and Product Account (NIPA) information. As with total saving figures, 
the two sources do not agree particularly well on the numbers. The 
time series on net acquisitions of financial assets by pension funds from 
the Flow of  Funds information is shown in table 3.3 for 1948 through 
1984. The numbers for 1984 show a fairly drastic decline. The 1984 
figure for private pensions alone was more than $30 billion less than 89  Pension Funding and Saving 
Table 3.2  Number and Growth of Pension Plans by Type 
Defined  Defined 
Benefit  Benefit Plans 
Defined  Defined  Qualified 
Benefit  Benefit  Minus  Total  Growth 
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SOURCE:  Employee Benefit Research Institute, Washington, D.C. 
NOTE:  In 1978-80,  the growth in the total number of plans does not match the number 
of qualified plans minus the number terminated. EBRl apparently derives these numbers 
from different sources and does not reconcile the totals. 
for  1982. The growth  rate in  net  acquisitions  is  also down, though 
less dramatically, for pensions managed  by insurance companies and 
state and local government pension  systems. The magnitude  of  the 
drop in net acquisitions from a trend line is comparable to the total 
inflow  of  money  into  IRA  and  Keogh  accounts. Thus, the  effects 
discussed here  appear to be large  relative  to the saving incentives 
mentioned  earlier.  The importance  of  net  acquisitions by  pension 
funds relative to personal saving can be judged by comparing columns 
4 and 5 of table  3.3. 90  B. Douglas BernheaJohn B. Shoven 
Table 3.3  Net Acquisitions of  Financial Assets by  Pension Funds ($ billion) 
NIPAa 
Personal 
Year  Private  Insured  State/Local  TOTAL  Saving 
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SOURCE:  Flow of  Funds, Federal Reserve System. 
aNational Income and Product Account, U.S. Commerce Department. 
The NIPA data for private pensions, which we use in the empirical 
work  of  section  3.2, is shown in  columns  1  and  2 of  table 3.4. The 
NIPA  provides separate information on contributions and benefits paid, 
and we generally consider it to be more reliable than the Flow of Funds 
numbers. The NIPA contribution  figures are based on business tax 91  Pension Funding and Saving 
Table 3.4  NIPA Data on Private Pension Contributions, Benefits, and 
Reversions ($ billion) 
Private Pension  Private Pension 
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=NIPA, “Other Labor Income by Industry and Type.” 
bPension Benefits Guarantee Corporation, Washington, D.C. 
return information, while their numbers for benefits paid are based on 
individual tax returns netted out for government pensions. This infor- 
mation is not yet available for 1984, so our estimations in section 3.3 
will not use the dramatic developments of that year. Column 3 of table 
3.4 contains information from the Pension Benefits Guarantee Corpo- 92  B. Douglas Bernheim/John B. Shoven 
ration on reversions.  Reversions have received a lot of attention re- 
cently, partly because a few large publicly held companies have ter- 
minated their pension plans in this manner. A pension plan reversion 
can occur when  the plan becomes overfunded.  The existing plan  is 
terminated  and a new  plan  (usually a defined contribution  plan)  is 
adopted (often with the old obligations covered by insurance company 
annuities). The excess of  the value of the plan assets over the cost of 
the annuities may revert to the company. The whole procedure is made 
possible because assets have previously earned more than the assumed 
interest rate. The case which received the most attention was the Great 
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. which recouped $272.9 million out of its 
$355.1 million pension fund with a reversion completed in  1984. The 
figures in table 3.4 show that the aggregate quantity of  reversions is 
still relatively  small,  but  the growth rate in  this  practice  has  been 
phenomenal.  The  reversions  already  pending  in  January  for  1985 
amounted to $1.824 billion, and the figure is likely to go much higher. 
Clearly, reversions reinforce the downward pressure on saving created 
by the lower net contributions. Reversions and the lower contributions 
actually have the same underlying cause.  In both cases, assets have 
been earning far in excess of assumed discount rates, resulting in many 
pension funds which are massively overfunded if  market rates were 
used  to discount the  pension  obligation.  Reversions  amount  to the 
company recognizing this profit suddenly, while most ongoing plans 
simply reduce contributions over a long period of time. 
Pension plans have been slow to adjust their assumed interest rates 
toward market rates. The mean assumed interest rate for plans with 
more than 1000 participants has climbed from 6 percent in 1980 to 7.2 
percent in  1984, as shown in table 3.5.  However, this growth in the 
assumed interest rate has been matched by increases in the assumed 
salary growth for the 70 percent of defined benefit plans which project 
wage increase in  determining liabilities. In fact, the spread between 
the interest assumption and the wage growth assumption has narrowed 
Table 3.5  Mean Assumed Interest Rates for Plans with over 
1000 Participants 
I976  5.5 percent 
1978  5.8 percent 
1980  6.0 percent 
1981  6.3 percent 
I982  6.8 percent 
1983  7.0 percent 
1984  7.2 percent 
SOURCE:  The Wyatt Company (1985). 93  Pension Funding and Saving 
slightly in  the past  eight years.  Since  1976, the average spread has 
decreased from 2.3 percent to 1.5 percent. 
The adjustment toward market interest rates may be occurring some- 
what faster than the previous numbers indicate, however. A strategy 
termed ‘‘immunization” or “dedication”  has become increasingly pop- 
ular. A portfolio is said to be immunized when the cash flow (interest 
plus principle) generated by the assets matches the cash flow of the 
pension liabilities. Dedication is a less precise matching strategy where 
the average duration of the assets matches the duration of the liabilities. 
By structuring the portfolio in these ways, plan managers are protecting 
themselves from interest rate risk.  A change to a dedicated or immu- 
nized portfolio amounts to suddenly changing the assumed interest rate 
to the market rate. In the suddenness of the adjustment, the adoption 
of these strategies is similar to a reversion. Total dedications and im- 
munizations amounted to at least $10 billion in  1984, with Ameritech 
leading the pack with a $2.4 billion asset dedication. Chrysler partic- 
ipated in a big way with a $1.1 billion immunization. The annualized 
yield  on Chrysler’s immunized portfolio exceeds  14  percent.  While 
aggregate  numbers are difficult to come  up  with,  this phenomenon 
appears to be somewhat larger than reversions, and certainly it amounts 
to an added factor dampening pension contributions. One final example 
of the effect of  dedication on contributions is given by the Western 
Conference of the Teamsters Union. The union  is in  the process of 
adopting the strategy for its entire $5.  I billion portfolio. In 1984 it placed 
$1.777 billion in dedicated bond portfolios yielding over 12 percent. 
When it completes the dedication process, the entire $1 billion of “un- 
funded liability” of its pension system will have been eliminated without 
further contributions.  Basically, by  structuring the portfolios in  this 
manner, actuaries are willing to raise the assumed interest rate to the 
market rate, thus dramatically lowering both unfunded liabilities and 
contributions. 
The effects of  high market interest rates and high stock market re- 
turns can be seen by examining the funding status of pension plans. 
Table 3.6 shows the distribution of the ratio of assets to present value 
of  accrued vested liabilities at  the end of  1983 for the Fortune 500 
industrials. Even using the companies’ interest rate assumptions, fully 
88 percent were fully funded and 34 percent were more than 50 percent 
overfunded. If the calculations are redone with a common 10 percent 
interest rate, 94 percent  are fully funded and almost 70 percent are 
more than 50 percent overfunded. The overfunding would be even more 
massive at true market interest rates which ranged between  13 and 15 
percent. The figures of table 3.6 were requested by the Financial Ac- 
counting Standards Board (FASB), Statement no. 36, and did not permit 
the use of salary growth projections. Many companies do make these 94  B. Douglas Bernheim/John B. Shoven 
Table 3.6  Distribution of Vested Funded Ratios for the Fortune 500 
Industrials for 1983 
Percent of Companies 
With Assumed 
Interest Rates  With  10% Interest Rate 
Funded Ratio  %  Accumulated %  %  Accumulated % 
200% and above 




12070-  1 29% 
110%  119% 

































90%  99%  3  91 
8070-  89%  4  95 
70%  79%  2  97 
60%  69%  1  98 
50%  59%  1  99 
Under 50%  1  100 
2  96 
2  98 
1  99 
1  100 
0  100 
0  I00 
SOURCE:  Hewitt Associates (1984). 
projections to calculate their unfunded liabilities and to determine con- 
tributions. Regardless of method, however, the funding levels of plans 
have dramatically improved in the last few years. Again, on the FASB 
no-projection basis, the percent of the Fortune 500 industrials whose as- 
sets are at least as much as accrued-vested benefits (with their discount 
rates) has climbed from 58 percent in 1980 to 69 percent in 1981,78 per- 
cent in 1982, and 88 percent in 1983. The figures are not available yet for 
1984, but a further gain in funding relative to liabilities is most likely. 
3.2  Theoretical Considerations 
In section 3. I, we described the institutional factors which largely 
govern the response of pension fund accumulation to changes in interest 
rates. Our next  objective is to quantify these effects using a simple 
model of  defined-benefit pension plans, for which we compute theo- 
retical long-run and short-run interest elasticities. Although these cal- 
culations provide us with a sense for magnitudes, certain critical pa- 
rameters  are  not  institutionally  determined.  In  order  to  refine  our 
estimates of  these interest elasticities, as well as to confirm the pre- 
dictions of  our theoretical analysis, we devote section 3.3 to an em- 
pirical analysis of pension fund accumulation. 95  Pension Funding and Saving 
Consider a firm which, in period t,  accrues new pension liabilities 
L‘  = (C+,,  . . .,  J%+T), 
where L;+T  is the liability accrued in period t to be paid in period  f  + 
T.  The notion of “accrual” used here corresponds to whatever actuarial 
convention is employed by firms under ERISA regulations. Let A‘  de- 
note its stream of  previously accrued liabilities: 
A‘  = (A:,  A;+,,  . . ., A:,  T). 
Here, A;+T  represents liabilities to be paid in period t + T,  which have 
been recognized by period t. These streams are related as follows: 
Note that A;  (T = 0) represents the value of pension 
firm must pay out in period t.  Throughout, we will 
real liabilities as given. 
In what follows, for any stream X  = (XI,  X,,,, 
denote the present discounted value of  X  by 
benefits which the 
take the stream of 
.  .  . ,  XI  + s),  we will 
S 
v,(x)  = 2 xt+N  + iIT  , 
T-0 
where i is the nominal interest rate. We will also denote the “duration” 
of X  by 
The duration of X  measures its average maturity. We  will use q[V,(X)] 
to denote the interest elasticity of V,(x).  The following result will prove 
useful: 
= - mx) 
Thus, the elasticity with respect to the interest rate of the value of 
a nominal stream of  payments is equal to the negative of  the stream’s 
duration. We  note that this is not the conventional interest elasticity 
expression, but it is approximately the percentage change in value per 
percentage point change in  the interest rate (precisely, it is the per- 96  B. Douglas BernheimIJohn B. Shoven 
centage change in value relative to the percentage change in  1  + i). 
This, of course, is quite a different figure from the traditional elasticity, 
which would in this case be the percentage change in value relative to 
the percentage change in the interest rate. As an example of the dif- 
ference, consider a consol which pays $1  per period as a perpetuity. 
Its present value is  l/i,  and the traditional elasticity of  its value with 
respect to the interest rate is -  I. The interest elasticity that we have 
just defined, which we should perhaps term the sensitivity or respon- 
siveness of  value to interest rate changes, is -  lii. We  have chosen to 
express our elasticities in this manner only because we find  it more 
natural to think about a  I  percentage point move in the interest rate 
from, say, 4 percent to 5 percent rather than a  I  percent change from, 
say, 4.00 percent to 4.04 percent. 
In this paper, we  will be concerned with changes in the real interest 
rate. To  avoid unnecessary notation, we simply denote every stream 
in  real dollars and discount by  the real rate, r. Subsections 3.2.1 and 
3.2.2 consider long-run and short-run effects, respectively. 
3.2.1  Long-Run Effects of Changes in the Real Interest Rate 
ERISA regulations permit temporary underfunding and overfunding 
of pension plans, but they require firms to fund their liabilities fully in 
the long run. It is therefore natural to begin our investigation by con- 
sidering steady  states, which are characterized by  constant interest 
rates (as well as other exogenous variables), and full funding of current 
liabilities. Thus, at time t,  pension assets (A,)  are given by 
(1)  A, =  V,(A')  . 
constant rate, g, by which we mean the following: 
We  will assume that, in the long run, the liability profile grows at a 
L;+T  = (1  + 8)"'  L;:+T . 
Note that this assumption places no constraint on the shape of the new 
liability profile L', although it does imply that benefits paid, A:,  and the 
value of discounted liabilities,  V,(Af), will grow at the rate g. Thus, 
pension assets, A,, will also grow at this rate. 
In steady state, pension assets always cover accrued liabilities ex- 
actly. Thus, to maintain full funding, current contributions, C,, must 
equal the value of new accrued liabilities: 
c, = V,(L')  . 
Between equations (1) and (2), we may analyze the steady-state effects 
of a change in the real interest rate on pension fund contributions and 
total capital accumulation, given a fixed liability profile. 97  Pension Funding and Saving 
The assumption of a fixed liability profile is essential to our calcu- 
lations. Yet, ordinarily, we would expect changes in the rate of interest 
to be accompanied by changes in wage rates and perhaps in levels of 
employment.  It is, therefore, important to clarify the nature of  our 
exercise. Ultimately, one is interested in the general equilibrium effects 
of any particular policy change. However, these effects are determined 
by partial equilibrium responses. The interest elasticity of saving, de- 
fined as the response of  saving to a change in the interest rate given 
fixed values of other variables  (such as wage rates and employment 
levels), often appears as a critical parameter in policy analyses. Con- 
sequently, many authors have attempted to measure personal saving 
elasticities. Our analysis is in the spirit of these earlier studies. 
From equation (l), we  see immediately  that the long-run  interest 
elasticity of pension fund assets is 
E,(A,) = -  D,(X‘)  7 
where, again, this elasticity is the percentage change in the value of 
assets for a 1 percentage point change in interest rates. While we have 
no data on the duration of current pension fund liabilities, it is instruc- 
tive to make some rough calculations based on hypothetical values. It 
seems reasonable to believe that the duration of outstanding liabilities 
is in the neighborhood of 15 years. If so, a 1 percentage point increase 
in the real interest rate would depress  the long-run value of pension 
fund assets by 15 percent. Given the current size of pension funds, this 
translates into roughly $100 billion of capital assets. 
A similar calculation for yearly contributions reveals that 
E,(C,)  = -  D,(L‘)  . 
Here we clearly see the “target saving” aspect of defined benefit pen- 
sion programs:  if all saving takes place to fund an expenditure in the 
following period [D,(L‘)  = I], then the elasticity of saving is -  I. Longer 
maturity  structures will  amplify the effect  of  interest rate  changes. 
Again, we have no direct evidence concerning the magnitude of D,(L‘). 
However, we can make suggestive calculations based on hypothetical 
values.  It seems reasonable to believe that the duration of  newly ac- 
crued liabilities is in the neighborhood of 30 years. If so, a 1 percentage 
point increase in the real interest rate would depress the long-run value 
of pension fund contributions by 30 percent. Given current magnitudes, 
this translates into roughly $25 billion. 
Of course, pension funds pay out significant benefits and earn interest 
on existing assets. Thus, net pension saving in year t,  N,, is given by 
N, = C, + rA, -  B, 98  B. Douglas BernheimIJohn B. Shoven 
(where benefits paid, B, =  A;).  Our previous calculations reveal how 
C, changes with the real interest rate. By assumption, B, is invariant. 
For the remaining term (reinvested interest on assets), we observe that 
our elasticity measure for rA, is 
1 
E,(rA,) = - - D,(Ar)  . 
r 
Taking r = 0.025, and D,(At) = 15 as before, yields an elasticity of 25. 
If, in addition, A, = $650 billion, then a 1 percentage point increase in 
the real interest rate will, through this channel, bring forth approxi- 
mately $4  billion in pension fund saving. 
It is useful to summarize the changes in net pension saving relative 
to total personal saving, S,. Suppose that AJS, = 4,  A,/C, = 8, A,/B, 
= 16, and r = 0.02 (these magnitudes correspond roughly to historical 
averages). Then 
1  + r dN,  c,  rA 
= -  E,(C,)  +  E,(rA,)  -- 
S,  dr  S,  Sr 
= .5  E,.(C,) + .1 E,(rA,)  . 
Using our previous values for stream durations, 
-.5(30)  + .1(25)  = - 12.5  . 
Thus, in the long run, a 1 percentage point increase in the real interest 
rate may  depress net  pension  fund  saving by  12.5 percent  of  total 
personal saving. 
If  investors perfectly pierce the corporate veil, then adjustments in 
private portfolios will completely offset these changes. However, if the 
offset does not occur or is only partial, the impact on private saving 
elasticities may be substantial. Of course, partial offsets are much more 
plausible in the short run than in the long run. In addition, unexpected 
changes in interest rates are likely to induce short-run capital gains or 
losses on existing assets, leading to short-run pension fund imbalances. 
It is therefore essential to consider the short-run response of pension 
funds to interest rate changes. 
3.2.2  Short-Run Effects of Changes in the Real Interest Rate 
Consider a pension fund with certain assets and liabilities. Suppose 
that there is an unanticipated change in the real interest rate during 
some period.  How does the accumulation of  pension fund assets re- 
spond in each successive period? It is useful to divide this question 
into two parts. First, how would the magnitude of unfunded liabilities 
respond to a change in interest rates, if the full impact of this change 
was recognized immediately? Second, how do  recognition and response 99  Pension Funding and Saving 
lags determine the timing of compensating adjustments? These ques- 
tions will be tackled in order. 
The response of  net unfunded liabilities to a change in the interest 
rate can be divided into two parts: changes in  assets and changes in 
liabilities. First, consider liabilities. The total value of  outstanding li- 
abilities is given by  V,(A‘).  We  have already calculated that 
~r[Vr(h‘)l  = - or@‘), 
and have argued that 15 is a reasonable hypothetical value for D,(Ar). 
Thus, an increase in interest rates, if recognized immediately, generates 
a large decline in the value of  outstanding liabilities, thereby tending 
to make pension plans overfunded. 
Next, consider the effect of interest rates on fund assets. Assets can 
be decomposed into three categories: bonds, physical capital, and stock 
(leveraged physical capital). It is straightforward to calculate the effect 
of interest rates on the value of bonds. Suppose that, in period t,  the 
pension fund contains bonds which provide a claim on the real income 
stream 
B‘  = (Bi+i,  . . .,  B:+R)  . 
(B;+,  represents the income from bonds in period tt-7 which the firm 
owns as of period t).  Then, as before, for our elasticity measure, 
E,(B‘) = -  D,(B‘)  . 
Again, we have no direct evidence of  the average maturity of bonds 
held in pension plans. While we have noted the recent trends to “ded- 
ication” and “immunization” (section 3.  l), we suspect that most plans 
hold bonds with short maturities relative to their liabilities. For pur- 
poses of hypothetical calculations, we will assume that the duration of 
bonds held in  pension plans is 5 years. Thus, an increase in interest 
rates  generates  a  significant decline  in  the  value  of  bonds,  thereby 
tending to make plans underfunded. 
The case of physical assets is somewhat more complicated. Specif- 
ically, the effect of interest rates on physical asset valuation depends 
critically upon whether a change in interest rates represents a change 
in the return on all existing units, or a change in the return on marginal 
units only. We  consider these cases separately. 
Case I:  Change in return on all existing units. 
In this case, the higher discount is matched by higher returns, so 
E, [V(P‘)]  = 0  . 
(P‘  represents the stream of  returns associated  with  physical  assets 
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Case 2:  Change in return on marginal assets only. 
In this case, a physical asset is indistinguishable from a bond, so 
€,  [V(P')I =  -D,(P')  . 
Since real physical assets often include items such as real estate, for 
which durations are quite long, we choose as our hypothetical value 
D,(Pf)  = 10. Thus, in case 2, an increase in interest rates generates a 
large decline in the value of real physical assets, again tending to make 
plans underfunded. 
Stocks can be thought of as leveraged physical assets, that is, as a 
combination of bonds and physical assets. To  calculate the effects of 
interest rates on equity values, we simply combine the preceding for- 
mulas appropriately. 
Let Yr be the stream of income associated with the physical assets 
of firms in which our hypothetical pension plan holds common stocks. 
Let 2'  be the stream of outstanding liabilities arising from debt contracts 
of these same firms. Let Ef  denote the stream of equity income: 
E;+T  = (1 - c)(y;+,  - Z+J  . 
(Here, C represents the corporate income tax rate.) Let a  denote the 
debt-equity ratio of  these firms: 
V,(Zf) 
(1 - C)  [V,(Y,) - Vf(Z91 
a=  * 
The effect of interest rates on equity values depends upon whether it 
involves case 1 or case 2, as defined above. 
Case 1:  €,[V,(E')]  = aD,(Z')  . 
Case 2:  E,[V,(E')] = CLD,(Z') -  (1 + a)D,(Y')  . 
In  case  1, an  increase  in  interest  rates tends to improve the asset 
positions of pension plans holding stocks. In case 2, the effect is am- 
biguous. For our hypothetical calculations, we will take a = 1/2, D,(Zr) 
= 5, and D,(Yf)  = 10. 
Now we assemble the various formulas given above. In year I, un- 
funded liabilities, U,, are given by 
u, = V,(h') - V,(B') - V,(P') - V,(E')  . 
Thus, the change in unfunded liabilities (as a proportion of total lia- 
bilities) resulting from a change in the real interest rate is given by 
-  1  t  rdU, 
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For purposes of calculations, we will assume that pension fund assets 
are evenly distributed between bonds, real assets, and stocks. Using 
the formulas and hypothetical parameter values listed above, we cal- 
culate two predicted responses of unfunded liablities to changes in the 
real  interest  rate,  corresponding  to the  assumptions  of  case  1  and 
case 2: 
Case 1 : 
Case2: 
1 + rdU,  1 
V,(hr) dr  6 
- -14-. 
1  + rdU,  5 
V,(hf) dr  6 
- - 5-. 
In both cases, the response of net unfunded liabilities to a 1 percentage 
point change in the interest rate is large. 
Now suppose that recognition and response effects were instanta- 
neous-capitalization  of the change is immediate, firms quickly switch 
to new interest  rates for accounting purposes, and  ERISA  requires 
firms to fully fund plans at all times. Then the instantaneous response 
of net contributions to pension plans would be enormous. In the more 
conservative case, following a rise in real interest rates of 1 percentage 
point, contributions would fall by 25  percent of  total private saving. 
Even if  adjustments in  personal  portfolios offset 80 percent  of  this, 
private saving would still fall by 5 percent. 
Of course, the response will not be instantaneous. While the evidence 
in section 3.1 suggests that interest rates employed for pension plan 
accounting do respond to market rates, they do so slowly. By account- 
ing convention, the historical costs of bonds, rather than their current 
market values, are used to compute pension net unfunded liabilities, 
so relevant bond values do not immediately reflect changes in market 
conditions. Finally, ERISA permits firms to cover unfunded liabilities 
over relatively long periods. Thus, we would expect actual unfunded 
liabilities to be dissipated over a relatively long time horizon. Never- 
theless, the magnitude of funding imbalances builds in significant down- 
ward pressure on the rate of contributions in the short run. 
Rather than attempt to flesh out an explicit model of the adjustment 
process, we turn directly to empirical evidence. In the following sec- 
tion, we estimate both the short-run and long- run effects of real interest 
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3.3  Empirical Evidence 
In the preceding  sections,  we  have argued  that institutional rules 
governing pension funds may significantly depress the response of pn- 
vate saving to changes in real interest rates, but no direct evidence has 
been offered to confirm or refute this hypothesis. In this section, we 
estimate a simple model of fund asset accumulation using aggregate 
time-series data. Our estimates corroborate the existence and magni- 
tude of  the effects described in  section 3.2. However, we must stress 
that we provide no evidence concerning the extent of  offsetting ad- 
justments in personal portfolios. Several other papers have investigated 
related issues concerning the permeability of the corporate pension veil 
(see, e.g.,  Bulow, Morck, and Summers  1987, Feldstein  and Morck 
1983, and Feldstein and Seligman 1981); in this matter, we use existing 
estimates as a guide. 
3.3.1  Estimation Technique 
The object here is to estimate the effect of changes in real interest 
rates on gross contributions to pension funds and to use these estimates 
to compute the net effect on fund asset accumulation. To  avoid prob- 
lems with scaling, we will attempt to explain variations in the ratio of 
current contributions to current benefits. According to our model, in 
steady state this ratio is given by 
(3) 
where g(.) is some function, X  is a vector of exogenous variables, and 
asterisks (*) denote steady-state values. The vector X  will include the 
interest rate, wage growth, and employment growth rates (this infor- 
mation determines the value of the function g) and information con- 
cerning the shape of new liability profiles. In steady state, the values 
of these variables remain unchanged, so we may omit a time subscript. 
Since we do not observe the economy in steady state, it is impossible 
to estimate equation (3) directly. One must explicitly describe the pro- 
cess of adjustment before implementing the model with aggregate time- 
series data. 
As stated in section 3.2.2, the adjustment to a new steady state is 
not instantaneous. Numerous factors induce lagged responses, including: 
(1) the adjustment of  expectations to a change in the current 
value  of  some variable  (real  interest  rates  or the rate of  wage 
growth) ; 
(2) the adjustment of assumed parameters used in pension fund 
accounting to changes in actual expectations concerning the cor- 
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(3) the revaluation of existing assets (such as bonds) under pen- 
(4) the adjustment of contributions to cover unfunded liabilities 
Undoubtedly, there are other sources of lags as well. Rather than model 
each separately to allow estimation of a structural model, we adopt a 
reduced form specification intended to represent the aggregate effects 
of these lags. Specifically, 
sion fund accounting conventions; and 
under ERISA regulations. 
(4) 
Note that if  the vector X, has remained at its current rate since the 
beginning of  time, CJB,  will assume the steady-state value associated 
with X,. 
Estimation of this relationship requires several simplifications. First, 
we linearize g(-): 
g(X,) = X,a  . 
Second, we restrict the lag structure as follows. We  allow po  and p1 
to be estimated freely and require that the effects of all right-hand-side 
variables thereafter decline at the common geometric rate, p (a scalar). 
That is, for t r  2, 
kt  = Pt-1CL  . 
Formally, it would be easy to allow additional flexibility by estimating 
(pO,  .  .  .  , pk)  without restriction and requiring geometric decline there- 
after. However, this consumes valuable degrees of freedom. Given the 
length of our sample period, a relatively restrictive specification was 
essential. 
When these restrictions are imposed, it is possible to simplify our 
basic functional specification, equation (4),  as follows: 
c,-  1  + ~,-l(Yl  - FCL.0)  + k - 
B,-  1 
As a practical matter, we will recover estimates of IJ. and the parameter 
vectors a,  ko,  and p1  by estimating the following relationship: 
Note that equation (6) is linear in variables and parameters. Further- 
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(6). Thus, we can estimate equation (6) using standard techniques (see 
subsection 3.3.3). This will yield an estimate of p  directly. Other prim- 
itive parameters can be recovered as follows: 
(7)  “ = Pd(1 - P)  9 
(8)  Po  = P1 - “P  3 
(9)  PI  = PPO  +  Pz  . 
Under the assumption that E, is independently and identically dis- 
tributed and independent of contemporaneous right-hand-side variables 
(interest rates, wage rates, etc.), equation (5)  may be estimated with 
ordinary least squares (OLS). While the second assumption does not 
trouble us, the first is a serious concern. Specifically, if  E, is autocor- 
related, C,-  JB,-  will be correlated with E,,  and OLS estimates will be 
inconsistent.  Consequently, we also estimate equation (6) with two- 
stage least squares (2SLS), instrumenting for C,- #?-  using lagged 
values of  the other independent variables. This produces consistent 
estimates. However, consistency is highly sensitive to the functional 
specification. If  our restrictions on the functional form are invalid (if, 
for example, the p,’s decline geometrically after two lags), our instru- 
ments will be invalid. Unfortunately, there are, of necessity, no alter- 
native candidates. 
3.3.2  Data 
Now the procedure described above will be implemented with ag- 
gregate U.S. time-series data. Our variables and their sources are as 
follows: 
G, = Annual gross contributions by employers to private pension 
and profit-sharing plans,  as reported in  the National  Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA) data (see Survey of Current Business, July 
issue of each year). This figure is derived from the reports of con- 
tributions on employers’ tax returns. Unfortunately,  a breakdown 
between defined benefit and other plans is unavailable.  The series 
begins in  1951. 
R,  = The dollar value of reversions to plan sponsors. Data on 
reversions have been  collected  by  the Pension  Benefit Guarantee 
Corporation since 1980, before which they were not an important 
phenomenon. 
C, = Annual contributions by employers to private pension and 
profit-sharing plans, net of reversions (C, = G, -  R,). 
B, = Benefits paid by private pension and welfare plans, as given 
in the NIPA data. This series is constructed primarily from data on 
pension  income reported  on individual income tax returns and is 
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i,  = The nominal rate of interest, defined as the average annual 
v, = The annual rate of change of wages and salaries for the average 
s,  = The annual total return (dividends plus capital gains) for the 
p, = The annual rate of inflation, as measured by the year-to-year 
Each of these rates  (if,  v,,  s,,  p,)  is measured  in percentage points, 
rather than fractions of unity. We  also define the following real rates 
of interest, wage-salary growth, and equity return: 
rate paid on Aaa long-term corporate bonds. 
full-time equivalent employee, as measured by the NIPA. 
Standard and Poor's 500 stock index. 
percentage change in the GNP deflator. 
r, = 1, -  P,  , 
e, = s,  -  p,  . 
We  do not mean these to represent expected real rates in any period. 
Rather, they are actual ex post  facto rates. Recall that our specification 
is designed to capture various lagged effects, including the adjustment 
of expectations to changes in ex post facto values. 
Note that most of our data predate ERISA. While firms undoubtedly 
had greater flexibility in funding pension plans prior to federal regu- 
lation, we suspect that most firms gravitated (however slowly) toward 
full funding. Presumably, the existence of ERISA will make pension 
fund contributions more responsive to interest rates than these data 
suggest. 
3.3.3  Estimates and Interpretation 
Estimates of equation (6) are presented in this section. We  took the 
vector of independent variables, X,, to include a constant term, the 
real interest rate, the real rate of wage-salary growth, the residual real 
rate of  equity return, and the rate of inflation (for AX,  we omitted the 
constant term, for obvious reasons). We  constructed the residual rate 
of  equity return, er,, as follows: we regressed the current real rate of 
equity return on r,, w,,  and p,, and set er, equal to the fitted residuals. 
Ourjustification for this procedure is that we are interested in all direct 
and indirect effects of changes in r, on rates of contributions. If  an 
unexpected rise in r, causes a change in stock values, thereby altering 
the value of pension fund assets, which in turn precipitates adjustments 
in contributions, this is a legitimate effect. 
We  estimated two versions of equation (6). In the first, we imposed 
no constraints on coefficients. In the second, we constrained the coef- 
ficient of  r,(pb) to equal the negative of the coefficient of w,(Pr).  In 
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relevant for determining pension fund balance. Each version of equa- 
tion (6) was estimated using both OLS and 2SLS techniques (see sub- 
section 3.3.1) on aggregate annual time-series data, from 1952 to 1982 
(see subsection 3.3.2). The results are presented in table 3.7. 
Several aspects of table 3.7 deserve immediate comment. Note that 
the signs of the coefficients on r,, w,,  err,  and p,  determine the direction 
of the long-run effects of these variables on contributions (see equation 
[7]). Thus, we see that the long-run interest and wage growth effects 
have the anticipated signs.  In fact, for both instrumented  and unin- 
strumented versions, the absolute value of the coefficient on r, is nearly 
the same as the coefficient of w,,  as predicted, so that imposing this 
constraint changes the estimates by negligible amounts. Note that the 
inflation rate increases long-run contributions (although the effect is 
not  statistically  significant in  three  out  of  four equations). Strictly 
speaking, this is inconsistent with our model-the  requirement of full 
funding determines C,/B,  independent of inflation. However, in prac- 
tice, firms may have the ability to somewhat overfund or underfund 
plans in the long run. With higher inflation rates, pension funds form 
a more desirable tax dodge; hence, contributions may increase with 
inflation. Finally, observe that long-run contributions rise with er,, al- 
though the coefficient is only marginally significant. In steady state, 
changes in err presumably reflect changes in the risk premium  asso- 
ciated with  equity.  Thus, the corresponding coefficient implies  that 
contributions increase as the risk premium associated with equity rises. 
Perhaps this reflects caution on the part of firms when facing greater 
variability on earnings from assets. 
While one might be  tempted to interpret the other coefficients in 
table  3.7 directly,  this  is potentially  misleading.  Only  the primitive 
coefficients can be easily interpreted, and thus they must be recovered 
by unscrambling our estimates using equations (7), (8), and (9). Since 
we are primarily concerned with assessing the effects of interest rates 
on contributions, we recover only those primitive parameters bearing 
directly on this issue (p, ar,  p6, and p?). These estimates, along with 
asymptotic standard errors, are presented in table 3.8. 
To interpret these coefficients, recall our basic specification (equation 
[3]). The coefficient a'  measures the long-run impact of the real interest 
rate on pension plan contributions (with wages fixed, interest rates do 
not affect benefits, the denominator). In particular, the OLS estimates 
indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the real interest rate will 
depress CAB, in the long run by more than 0.4  (40 percent of benefits). 
If  the long-run value of C,/B,  is approximately 2, this implies a long- 
run interest  elasticity of  contributions in the neighborhood  of  -20. 
(Again, in this section, the elasticity is the percentage change in con- 
tributions for a 1 percentage point change in the interest rate.) 2SLS 
estimates imply that the magnitude of this effect is 50 percent larger. 107  Pension Funding and Saving 
Table 3.7  Estimated Equations 
OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS 
Variable  Unconstrained  Constrained  Unconstrained  Constrained 
constant  0.398  0.460  1.45  1.55 
(0.208)  (0.168)  (0.76)  (0.66) 
(0.035)  (0.033)  (0.076)  (0.066) 
(0.043)  (0.038)  (0.128)  (0.113) 
(0.048)  (0.047)  (0.139)  (0.134) 
rl  -  0.093  -  0.097  -0.416  -0.425 
Ar!  -0.013  -  0.004  0.153  0.168 
Ari-  I  -  0.024  -0.021  0.240  0.245 
w1  0.118  0.097  0.460  0.425 
(0.052)  (0.033)  (0.142)  (0.066) 
-0.056  -  0.046  -0.365  -  0.347 
(0.040)  (0.034)  (0.102)  (0.079) 
Awl- I  -0.038  -  0.033  -0.230  -0.222 
(0.028)  (0.026)  (0.076)  (0.069) 
er,  0.0076  0.0072  0.029  0.029 
(0.0040)  (0.0039)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Aer,  -0.0065  -  0.0064  -0.021  ~  0.02 1 
Aer,.  I  -0,0029  -0.0027  -0.011  -0.01 1 
(0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
(0.00  1  9)  (O.OOl0)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
PI 
AP, 
0.027  0.020  0.062  0.051 
(0.016)  (0.010)  (0.060)  (0.046) 
-0.075  -  0.070  -0.210  -  0.201 
(0.036)  (0.033)  (0.108)  (0.100) 
Apr- 1  -0.053  -  0.054  0.003  0.0021 
(0.053)  (0.041)  (0.135)  (0.133) 
Ct - IIB,  ~  I  0.775  0.777  0.343  0.349 
Durbin-Watson  2.66  2.68  1.54  1.56 
Standard Error  0.088  0.087  0.280  0.273 
of Regression 
(0.057)  (0.056)  (0.195)  (0.189) 
NOTE:  OLS = ordinary least squares; 2SLS = two-stage least squares. Standard errors 
given in parentheses. 
The estimates of p.6 and PI;  indicate a relatively smooth, monotonic 
adjustment of  CJB, to its steady-state value. In the first year following 
a  1 percentage point rise in the real rate of  interest, C,/B,  changes by 
ar + p;.  For the OLS estimates, a'  + p;  = -0.1,  which implies a 
short- run impact elasticity in the neighborhood of -  5 (one-quarter of 
the adjustment in CAB, occurs in the first year). For the 2SLS estimates, 
the impact elasticity is much higher (approximately -  13), and a larger 
proportion of the adjustment (more than one-third) occurs in the first 
year. Both OLS and 2SLS estimates imply that just under half of the 108  B. Douglas BernheidJohn B. Shoven 
Table 3.8  Primitive Parameters 
OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS 
Parameter  Unconstrained  Constrained  Unconstrained  Constrained 
CL  0.775 
(0.057) 
(0.089) 
14  0.307 
(0.085) 
CLZ  0.214 
(0.048) 

























NOTE:  OLS = ordinary least squares; 2SLS = two-stage least squares. Standard errors 
given in parentheses. 
adjustment is complete by the second year. Thereafter, 2SLS estimates 
imply much more rapid adjustment to the steady state (compare the 
values of  p.).  It is interesting to note that, for the OLS estimates,  p.; 
= pp;,  so that the additional flexibility offered through inclusion of the 
lagged parameter makes very little difference. 
To assess more fully the implications of our estimates, we calculate 
implied steady-state values of (C,/B,)  and (A,/B,)  under different interest 
rate assumptions. As mentioned earlier, the implied steady-state value 
of (C,/B,)  is given by substituting values of variables and parameters 
into equation (4), where AX-7 is set equal to zero for all 7.  Obtaining 
the implied steady-state value of A,/& is only slightly more difficult. 
Along any path, the value of pension assets evolves as follows: 
Here, p represents the rate of  return on the pension portfolio.  This 
may differ from r, because of the risk characteristics of this portfolio. 
Equation (10) can be rewritten as 
In steady state, A,+JA,  = 1 + g, the growth rate of pension benefits. 
Thus, 
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Given values of r, w,  er, g,  and the risk premium associated with pension 
funds (p -  r),  we can calculate (C,/B,)*  and (A,/&)* through equations 
(4)  and (1  1). 
The calculations for these steady-state contribution and asset ratios 
are presented in table 3.9. We  set the variables appearing in our regres- 
sion analysis equal to their recent (20-year) historical averages. Col- 
umns designated “initial” refer to an assumed real interest rate of 0.025. 
Columns labeled “final” refer to an assumed real interest rate of 0.015. 
We take p -  r = 0.03, and g = 0.10. This assumed rate of real pension 
benefit  growth may  seem quite high,  but  it  accords with  historical 
experience, presumably because of the immaturity of  most pension 
programs. We  chose to make our calculations using the value of g which 
prevailed for the sample period, rather than a more “realistic”  steady- 
state value, because our estimates may be unreliable in a regime of 
substantially lower pension benefit growth. 
Recall from our theoretical discussion that the (absolute) long-run in- 
terest elasticity of contributions should equal the duration of newly ac- 
crued pension liabilities while the (absolute) long-run interest elasticity 
of assets should equal the duration of outstanding liabilities. Of course, 
one must adjust for the fact that approximately one-third of pension plans 
are not defined benefit. Nevertheless, all estimates appear to be roughly 
consistent with the magnitudes proposed in section 3.2. Only one anom- 
aly appears: for the 2SLS estimates, the implied duration of outstanding 
liabilities slightly exceeds the duration of newly accrued liabilities. We 
suspect that our estimates of (Ad&)*  are not entirely reliable due to the 
maturation of the pension system during our sample period. We hope to 
improve these calculations in subsequent study. 
3.4  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have developed a simple analytical model which 
suggests that the long-run percentage responsiveness of  contributions 
Table 3.9  Long-Run Impacts of Real Interest Rate Changes 
(C/B)  *  (A/B)* 
Version  Initial  Final  % Change  Initial  Final  % Change 
Uninstrumented,  2.070  2.475  19.6  24.18  27.04  11.8 
Unconstrained 
Uninstrumented,  2.026  2.460  21.4  23.19  26.76  15.4 
Constrained 
Instrumented,  2.008  2.640  31.5  22.78  30.06  32.0 
Unconstrained 
Instrumented,  1.982  2.635  32.9  22.19  29.97  34.8 
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to a  1 percentage point increase in  the interest rate should equal the 
duration of  newly accrued pension liabilities, and the responsiveness 
of pension assets should equal the duration of existing liabilities. The 
OLS and 2SLS aggregate time-series estimates of section 3.3 are re- 
markably consistent with this model. This analysis suggests that the 
operation of pension funds may significantly affect the way our econ- 
omy responds to incentives for capital formation. 
The importance of  this target-savinghegative  elasticity of  contn- 
butions theory  has been borne out by  recent economic experience. 
Real interest rates have been at record levels for the past three years, 
and the effect this has had on pension funding has been considerable. 
The earnings of pension fund assets have been much greater than ac- 
tuarial assumptions with the result  being that a majority of  pension 
funds are fully funded (even at their still-below-market assumed interest 
rates), and net contributions are down over $30 billion since 1982. Net 
contributions are likely to remain below the 1982 level because of the 
considerable lags in  the pension  actuarial  system.  Such recent and 
increasingly important phenomena as pension reversions, dedications, 
and immunizations also reflect the gap between market interest rates 
and the previously assumed rates, and they reinforce the downward 
pressure on loanable fund saving from this source. Thus, adjustments 
of pension fund contributions may continue to depress personal saving 
for years to come. 
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Comment  Eugene Steuerle 
In their paper, Bernheim and Shoven make a valuable contribution to 
recent attempts to explain both changes in personal saving rates and 
changes in the net flow of funds into pension plans. To the extent that 
pension plans are designed to meet certain target saving goals, pension 
funding (contributions less payments) will  have a negative  elasticity 
(or, more exactly, responsiveness) to changes in the real interest rate. 
The arguments are intuitively appealing and, from my  discussions 
with other experts on pensions, provide a rational explanation of much 
current activity. The tax laws limit overfunding with respect to pension 
plans. While higher real interest rates might eventually lead to increased 
benefit levels, over the short run they are likely to lead to lower levels 
of funding for a promised or targeted level of benefits. Regardless of 
the underlying reasons, both actuaries and managers of firms do fund 
pension plans to reach some target level of benefits. 
While Bernheim and Shoven have enhanced our understanding  of 
one important influence on pension funding, in the ideal, one would 
want to test the relative impact of all other influences on pension fund- 
ing. Unfortunately, Bernheim and Shoven only have 3  1 observations 
of data (from an annual time series from 1952 to 1982) and have few 
degrees of freedom left in a model with  13 independent variables plus 
a constant term. With so few observations, it is not clear how alter- 
native theories could be tested. 
I will  list  some additional factors that  I  believe  had  a  significant 
impact on pension funding over the period of time examined by Bern- 
heim and Shoven. 
First, the Pension Reform Act of 1974 forced funding of many plans 
that were underfunded prior to that time. Underfunding is advantageous 
to stockholders because  some expected costs are shifted to workers 
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and government as long as there is some probability of bankruptcy in 
the future. The passage of the 1974 Act therefore should have increased 
pension funding for several years, but in a declining fashion as more 
and more plans became fully funded. 
Second, the IRS imposes limits on funding that operate differently 
with different rates of inflation. The tax laws not only set a maximum 
level of benefits that can be provided under a qualified plan, but they 
also disallow contributions necessary to fund future expected increases 
in that maximum amount due tofuture  inflation. As expected inflation 
increases, it becomes more likely that more workers (especially younger 
workers) will be entitled to benefits in excess of the maximum amount 
allowed to be funded by the IRS. In addition, higher rates of inflation 
generally lower the real benefits that will be paid to workers who leave 
a firm before retirement. Thus, inflation might be expected to have a 
negative impact on funding in pension plans, although Bernheim and 
Shoven find the opposite (usually statistically insignificant) result. 
Third, changes in income and Social Security tax rates should have 
a major impact on pension funding. Higher tax rates enhance the ben- 
efits of  the tax  preference granted to saving through pension plans. 
These tax rates  have  changed  substantially over the period  of  time 
analyzed by Bernheim and Shoven. 
Fourth, the changing demographic nature of the population should 
affect levels of funding. In general, the current tax treatment of fringe 
benefits tends to discriminate against secondary workers (Kosters and 
Steuerle 1981). In the case of pensions, the greater turnover rate for 
secondary workers should decrease the amount of  expected benefits 
that would be paid out under typical defined benefit plans designed for 
long-term workers. 
Fifth, some changes in pension funding could reflect cyclical, as well 
as long-term, adjustments. I have shown elsewhere how after-corporate- 
tax payments to owners of corporate capital tend toward constancy 
over the economic cycle (Steuerle 1985). A pension fund offers man- 
agers a ready device by which to steady the reported earnings stream 
over time. Thus, it is possible that some adjustments in payments to 
pension plans merely reflect cyclical, rather than long-term, responses 
to changes in interest rates. 
Sixth, there  is a  substantial debate over the  extent to which  the 
increased availability of IRAs and other defined contribution options 
reduces  the demand  of  workers for defined benefit plans.  Certainly 
some offset  has  taken place  over the same period  of time that  real 
interest rates have risen. 
Finally, as noted above, increases in the inflation rate have decreased 
the real liabilities of defined benefit  pension  plans.  Any model  may 
have difficulty separating out this effect if the lag with which actuaries 113  Pension Funding and Saving 
respond to these changes is unknown. I have argued that some of the 
reductions in funding in the 1980s should be attributed to this decline 
in real liabilities, although I have not tested this conclusion. A survey 
of changes in actuarial assumptions in major pension plans could help 
resolve the question of how long it takes for changes in inflation and 
real interest rates to affect funding within pension plans. 
In summary, Bernheim and Shoven have enhanced our understanding 
of recent changes in pension funding. Changes in real interest rates are 
likely to have a significant impact on pension funding under any targeted 
benefit approach. While their logic is clear, the number of data obser- 
vations is inadequate to test the relative importance of this one factor 
relative to other factors known to have been operating at the same 
time. 
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